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Abstract
The extant literature has demonstrated that the logic of retaliation is a core feature of 
negative campaigning. Attacks by one side induce counterattacks by the other. Yet 
most research on the interactive nature of negative campaigning is limited to two-party 
competition and provides little theoretical justification for why political actors should 
respond to attacks with counterattacks. The present paper addresses these research 
gaps. We argue that the negativity bias in human information processing and the zero-
sum nature of elections make retaliation a rational strategy. Importantly, these arguments 
also imply that retaliation may not be the only plausible response to attacks in multiparty 
systems. Rather, parties may prefer to react to attacks from one competitor by attacking 
another. To grasp empirically how being attacked and attacking are related, we conduct 
a highly disaggregated time series analysis of such instances while controlling for other 
factors that may influence actor behavior. Our analyses draw on several thousand 
party press releases issued during three national election campaigns in Austria, a typical 
European multiparty system. They show that retaliation is an important strategy also 
in multiparty politics. Yet in such context, parties do not exclusively follow a tit-for-tat 
approach but rather display more complex patterns of attack behavior.
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Introduction
Extant research has identified retaliation as one important driver of negative cam-
paigning (e.g., Damore 2002; Druckman et al. 2010; Lau and Pomper 2004). Candidates 
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who are attacked by their opponents often respond in kind—not least as this is what 
political practitioners canonically recommend (Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Trent 
et al. 2011). Yet the study of the logic of retaliation remains incomplete in several 
respects: First, it lacks a clear theoretical argument as to why retaliation is preferable 
to ignoring attacks or responding with positive messages about oneself. Second, 
empirical analyses of retaliation often rely on aggregate data at the level of campaigns 
and thus find it difficult to demonstrate or at least approach causality. Third, it is not 
clear to what extent the insights from the best-researched elections, those in the United 
States, travel to systems with multiparty competition, proportional electoral systems, 
and coalition governments.
The contribution of this article is to address these three shortcomings. Theoretically, 
we build on the evidence of negativity bias in human information processing (Ito et al. 
1998; Rozin and Royzman 2001). We argue that in combination with the logic of elec-
tions as zero-sum games, negativity bias makes retaliation a dominant strategy in two-
party, winner-takes-all competition. Yet we also show that this argument may not 
necessarily generalize to other contexts. This discussion results in two hypotheses that 
capture specific aspects of the logic of retaliation, both in general terms and with 
respect to the context of multiparty competition. Empirically, we improve on existing 
research designs by conducting the most high-resolution time series analysis of attacks 
and counterattacks to date. As regards the political context, our analysis covers three 
national elections in Austria (2002, 2006, and 2008), a typical European multiparty 
system with proportional representation (PR) and coalition governments. Our study 
thus also contributes to the emerging field of research in negative campaigning in 
multiparty systems (Nai and Walter 2015).
Our main finding is that although multiparty competition allows for alternative 
strategies, the logic of retaliation is empirically strong. Once attacked, parties are 
likely to pay back the attacker in kind. Yet we also find evidence for more complex 
interactions, with the targets not turning against the sender but against parties not 
originally involved in the attack. This finding lends further support to the notion that 
multiparty competition and PR are crucial context factors that analyses of negative 
campaigning need to take into account.
The Logic of Retaliation in Negative Campaigning
Scholars have amassed a huge wealth of research on negative campaigning. 
Explanations of its causes have largely focused on structural and performance-related 
factors. Incumbency, ideology, partisanship, campaign resources, performance in the 
polls, closeness of a race, and candidate gender, among others, have all been hypoth-
esized to affect the tendency to “go negative” (Lau and Pomper 2004; Lau and Rovner 
2009). Although numerous studies find these factors to have an impact on parties’ and 
candidates’ strategies, they tend to take a very aggregated and static view of cam-
paigns. In a more disaggregated and dynamic perspective, campaigns might be con-
ceived of as a stream of interaction where parties and candidates continuously respond 
to various stimuli and do so in strategically differentiated ways.
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Retaliation in the Extant Literature
How do parties react to attacks? Parties may simply neglect or repudiate them by 
defending the issue position or the candidate under attack without directly confronting 
the opponent. But they may also resort to a counterattack, as political consultants typi-
cally recommend (Trent et al. 2011). This seems to be intuitive: “If we had to choose 
one hypothesis [to explain negative campaigning] that we were most certain would be 
supported by the data, this would be our bet” (Lau and Pomper 2004: 33). The only 
exception to this rule might be attacks by weak candidates, which may safely be 
neglected (Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Trent et al. 2011).
Although they are typically recommended as responses to attacks, counterattacks 
might also backfire. Experimental research indicates that both target and attacker incur 
substantial favorability losses. However, while respondents overtly condemn attacks, 
they also show higher levels of spontaneous conformity with a candidate who punches 
back (Carraro et al. 2012; see also Roddy and Garramone 1988). Furthermore, coun-
terattacks can restore electoral support for the target to almost preattack levels (Craig 
et al. 2014). These results thus provide a rational foundation for counterattacks.
Empirical evidence based on observational research is rather thin. Only a small 
number of nonexperimental studies have examined whether the amount of attacks 
deployed by one party is dependent on how much it is attacked by its opponents. 
Some results are unambiguous and show a strong effect of previous attacks (Damore 
2002; de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013; Druckman et al. 2010; Haynes and Rhine 
1998; Lau and Pomper 2001, 2004). Other studies report mixed findings (Ridout and 
Holland 2010). Kahn and Kenney (1999), by contrast, did not find the expected 
association at all.
Why Retaliate? Zero-Sum Elections and Negativity Bias
With respect to the theoretical foundation, the logic of retaliation appears to be so intui-
tive that its plausibility does not seem to require a great amount of justification. 
Researchers often refer to common wisdom, the advice of political consultants (Lau 
et al. 1999), or do not explain the rationale at all. If they do, two closely linked arguments 
are typically presented: First, a candidate who does not counterattack “create[s] the 
image that he [is] ineffectual and indecisive” (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995: 117). 
Second, while negative campaigning is indeed often disliked,1 mass media and voters 
are more likely to regard counterattacks as legitimate (Krupnikov and Bauer 2014).
To provide a more solid theoretical foundation, our argument builds on two prem-
ises. First, elections are zero-sum games. All gains and losses in vote shares sum to 
zero. It is therefore the relative popularity of parties that counts. Second, negative 
messages weigh heavier in human information processing than positive ones. If attacks 
are believed to have a negative net effect on the target, the loss in relative popularity 
can only be made up for by retaliating against the attacker.
The zero-sum logic obviously applies to two-party competition but is true even in 
multiparty systems. Here, one party’s loss is not automatically a win for any specific 
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opponent, but it is certainly a gain for some competitor. What matters is thus not how 
voters evaluate parties in absolute terms but how parties stack up against each other. 
The vote-seeking imperative therefore dictates that parties try to maximize their sup-
port in the electorate relative to that of others.
With respect to our second premise, many (if not all) politicians and strategists 
believe that negative messages have an effect on voter evaluations, which is disadvan-
tageous for the target even though the direct evidence that negative campaigning 
yields a net benefit for the attacker is rather thin (Lau and Pomper 2004; Lau et al. 
1999; Lau et al. 2007). However, even if political operatives believe that attacks are 
harmful for the target, why should they choose to respond in kind instead of compen-
sating the assumed losses with positive messaging about their own party? We argue 
that the prime obstacle to choosing a positive response over retaliation lies in the 
asymmetric impact that negative and positive messages have on evaluative 
processes—a phenomenon denoted as negativity bias (Rozin and Royzman 2001). As 
Ito et al. (1998) show, negativity bias is already present at very early stages of the 
evaluative process. Furthermore, negative messages are more influential than positive 
ones as they are more likely to be believed (Hilbig 2009). Thus, in many dimensions, 
“[b]ad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al. 2001).
Negativity bias also applies to political messaging (Meffert et al. 2006).2 The most 
important implication in this regard is that negativity increases the news value of polit-
ical messages (Groeling 2010; Lengauer et al. 2011). Given that the empirical material 
in our analysis comes from press releases, it is crucial to consider not only how voters 
will be influenced by party messages but also how the media may respond to campaign 
communication.
All else being equal, attacks and conflict frames are more newsworthy than non-
controversy (Harcup and O’Neill 2001; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). In compet-
ing for the attention of journalists, parties therefore have incentives to respond to 
negative messages about themselves with negative messages about their competitors. 
Otherwise, their message may not attract as much media attention as the opponents’ 
initial attack.
The increasing importance of direct communication through social media notwith-
standing, most campaign communication is still delivered through traditional media 
channels. Political actors thus do not only have to consider voter responses when 
drafting messages, but they also have to anticipate the process of journalistic news 
selection and adapt their behavior to the media logic.
This suggests that parties and candidates who are attacked may not find themselves 
able to reverse the negative effect of that attack by focusing on positive messages 
about themselves. As bad weighs heavier than good in the minds of voters and journal-
ists, the damage resulting from an attack can only be compensated by responding in 
kind. Thus, targets of negative campaigning may be able to make up relative losses by 
retaliating and thus lowering the electorate’s perception of their opponent. The most 
straightforward way to offset the damage is to inflict a similar cost on the political 
opponent. Responding to an attack with a counterattack thus emerges as the dominant 
strategy. This is our first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): An attack from party A on party B raises the probability of a 
counterattack from party B on party A.
A counterattack is defined as an attack by the original attack’s target shortly after 
having been hit and directed against the attacker. This logic of retaliation is perfectly 
suited for two-party races and elections following a winner-takes-all logic. Multiparty 
races with PR, by contrast, might follow a different logic. Here, our understanding of 
negative campaigning remains limited as the existing studies focus mostly on the 
United States. Notwithstanding the importance of U.S. campaign style as international 
model generator, these studies also reflect the specifics of this country’s political sys-
tem. This clearly applies to studies dealing with retaliation in two-party races such as 
elections to the U.S. presidency and congress (Damore 2002; Druckman et al. 2010; 
Kahn and Kenney 1999; Lau and Pomper 2001, 2004). However, even analyses cover-
ing multicandidate races such as nomination campaigns or primaries (Haynes and 
Rhine 1998; Ridout and Holland 2010) are not mirror pictures of PR systems due to 
the electoral system’s winner-takes-all logic.
Moving to Multiparty Competition
Research on negative campaigning in (European) multiparty competition has so far 
not addressed the dynamics of campaign interactions. The only exception is the study 
of de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis (2013) who find no evidence that Dutch politicians 
directly respond to attacks with counterattacks. Rather, political actors attack the allies 
of their attackers, but this result may in part be due to the fact that the study does not 
aggregate individuals into parties.
As argued above, the zero-sum logic also applies to multiparty competition, and the 
logic of retaliation (H1) might be dominant even in such races. Yet there are several 
important reasons why direct retaliation against the sender may not always be the most 
preferred option for the targeted party in multiparty systems.
First, there is often a stark asymmetry in size between sender and target. Larger par-
ties have incentives to ignore smaller ones and instead focus on rivals within their 
“weight category,” simply because the electoral impact of attacking a smaller party is 
likely to be limited (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995; Walter 2014). Also, large mainstream 
parties may want to define the campaign’s center of gravity and not let it be captured by 
niche parties and niche issues (Meyer and Wagner 2013). Rather than merely absorbing 
the hits from smaller parties, larger parties may choose to react by attacking their main 
rivals to compensate the relative losses that they have incurred from being attacked.
Second, elections typically produce minority situations that necessitate the forma-
tion of a coalition government. Parties therefore need to be strategic about which of 
their competitors to attack, given that they may need partners after the election 
(Elmelund-Præstekær 2008; Walter and van der Brug 2013; Walter et al. 2014). A 
party’s goal then may not simply be to maximize its vote share but rather to maximize 
its bargaining power in postelection negotiations and therefore to maximize the num-
ber of potential viable coalition governments that it is part of. For example, if one 
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right-wing party attacks another, retaliation may produce some intra-bloc voter 
exchange without expanding the overall prospects of a right-wing majority. The better 
strategy may be to react to attacks by attacking those rivals from which voters need to 
be drawn to produce the preferred coalition.
Third, a party may react to attacks by targeting whichever party it sees as its main com-
petitor based on current poll ratings. Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), for instance, predict 
that parties in three-way competition never attack the weaker of their two opponents—this 
formal model assumes single-member districts, though. Still, even in multiparty PR sys-
tems, it may be rational for the runner-up to always attack the leading party (e.g., when 
finishing first confers an advantage in the government formation process). However, simi-
lar reasoning applies to smaller parties, as coming in just ahead of a competitor may make 
a significant difference in terms of postelection bargaining power.
A specific characteristic of multiparty competition is heightened competition for 
media attention. Given time and space constraints, it is more difficult to cover the 
policy statements and campaign messages of seven parties than of two. In instances 
where—for whatever reason—direct retaliation is not the preferred option, this makes 
reacting to attacks with positive issue or valence messages an unattractive option, as 
such messages are even less likely to prevail than they would be under two-party com-
petition. The best reaction in such cases is then to attack a third party, as such a mes-
sage will be of higher news value.
These arguments illustrate that attacks need not always trigger retaliation but can 
sometimes lead the targeted party to direct negative messages toward a third actor. 
Attacks by one party against another may simply lead the attacked party to reinforce 
its strategy of attacking whichever competitor they have singled out as their preferred 
target anyway. While one may object that it is difficult to ascertain in such instances 
whether it was the first attack that caused the second, we rely on extremely close tem-
poral sequence and thousands of observations to examine whether the correlations in 
attack patterns conform to our assumptions.
To illustrate our theorizing more clearly, consider a party system with five parties A 
to E. Direct retaliation (H1) looks like this (arrows denote temporal sequence):
B attacks A A attacks B→
However, as it becomes clear from the examples above, other forms of interaction 
are also possible. These interactions involve more than two parties:
C or D or E  attacks A A attacks B[ ] →
Here, party A chooses to attack a party other than the original instigator. Assume, 
for instance, that it may have been A’s strategy to attack B all along and that, for rea-
sons such as those outlined above, the party would prefer not to be dragged into con-
flicts with other parties. So the way in which A reacts to an attack by C, D, or E is to 
B attacks A → A attacks [C or D or E]
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reinforce its attacks on B. This type of interaction is captured by the two hypotheses 
below. H2a outlines the scenario in which party A always prefers to attack B and there-
fore reacts to attacks by other parties by targeting B. Under H2b, party A prefers to 
ignore attacks from B and reacts by attacking some other party.3
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): An attack on party A by parties other than B increases the 
probability of an attack of A on B.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): An attack on party A by party B increases the probability of 
an attack of A on parties other than B.
Empirical Strategy
Case Selection
This study focuses on Austria, a typical West European parliamentary democracy with 
a PR electoral system, multiparty politics, coalition governments, and a democratic-
corporatist media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Plasser and Lengauer 2010). 
While negative campaigning has been an important feature of elections throughout the 
postwar period, systematic studies are mostly missing (see Dolezal et al. 2015a).
In the present paper, we analyze three of the most recent general elections (2002, 
2006, and 2008). In this period, the party system has included the two parties dominat-
ing postwar politics, the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 
[SPÖ]) and the Christian democratic People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei 
[ÖVP]), the Greens (Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative), and the populist radical 
right Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [FPÖ]) plus its breakaway, the 
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich [BZÖ]).
In terms of government formation, the by far most frequent coalition type in post-
war Austria has been a grand coalition of the SPÖ and ÖVP. Yet in the elections stud-
ied, three different governments were in office, ÖVP-FPÖ (2002), ÖVP-BZÖ (2006), 
and SPÖ-ÖVP (2008), the first and the last of which were terminated in conflict and 
resulted in early elections. As a general pattern, Austrian parties act very cohesively 
and do not make public their coalition preferences before the election but sometimes 
commit not to form particular coalitions (e.g., the SPÖ has ruled out the FPÖ as a 
coalition partner since 1986).
Data Source
Analyzing negative campaigning with a special focus on parties’ dynamic interaction 
requires data that capture not only which parties use these strategies and whom they 
attack. We also need the exact timing of party messages to infer patterns of attacks and 
counterattacks empirically—information not all sources provide. Our analysis is based 
on parties’ press releases. While common as a data source in agenda-setting studies 
(Brandenburg 2002; Tedesco 2005), press releases have hardly been used to analyze 
negative campaigning.4 This is a missed opportunity as they are a great source for 
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observing parties’ campaign behavior and addressing our specific research question 
for two main reasons:
First, press releases are under the direct control of the sender. This is an obvious but 
important advantage compared with other modes of communication used by scholars 
so far. The analysis of media reports, for instance, does not capture party behavior 
directly but observes what journalists write about it (Elmelund-Praestekaer and 
Molgaard-Svensson 2014; Hansen and Pedersen 2008). Journalists may interpret 
actions by parties in a way that was actually not intended. Patterns of attack and retali-
ation, for example, might therefore not always be reported accurately.
Second, press releases are issued frequently and continuously during the campaign. 
Among all traditional means of political communication, this one allows for the quick-
est responses. The fact that every press release is traceable to an exact date and time 
also allows for precise sequencing. We can therefore analyze whether parties respond 
immediately to relevant stimuli such as attacks.
Contrary to media reports and televised debates, advertisements are also under the full 
control of parties and—in some contexts—occur at a high frequency. Especially TV spots 
that have become almost synonymous with political advertising, but also ads in newspa-
pers and party posters have been widely used to study negative campaigning (e.g., 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Elmelund-Præstekær 2008, 2010; Geer 2006; Hansen 
and Pedersen 2008; vanHeerde-Hudson 2011; Walter 2014; Walter and Vliegenthart 2010). 
In Austria, however, TV spots are not relevant as legal provisions prevent parties from buy-
ing airtime in the ORF, the still dominant public broadcast station (Plasser and Plasser 
2002). By contrast, ads and posters are highly relevant, but they do not allow for a dynamic 
analysis as parties typically use the same design for several days or even weeks.
To be sure, there are some caveats about using press releases. The most relevant for 
the present purpose stems from the fact that they are a tool actors use to attract media 
attention. Parties may therefore adapt their message to journalistic selection criteria 
giving more weight to conflict and attacks. The overall level of negativity displayed by 
press releases should therefore not necessarily be considered representative of other 
campaign communication. However, we expect no bias in favor of our hypothesis 
from this fact, as heightened negativity should be present equally across parties.
Our study is based on all press releases sent by parties and candidates within the 
final six weeks of each campaign. We obtained them from the Austrian Press Agency’s 
(APA) Web site www.ots.at. We discard releases by low-ranking politicians (e.g., local 
representatives) as we are only interested in the national parties’ strategies. However, 
all candidates on party lists are regarded as relevant actors.
The remaining 6,750 press releases are coded using a relational method of content 
analysis that links actors to issues and/or other actors. A variable called predicate con-
nects them and records whether their relation is positive (1), negative (−1), or neutral 
(0). This method goes back to the work of Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (e.g., 
Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001) and was also used by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008; 
Kriesi et al. 2012). The Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) has further 
developed this approach and employs it for the analysis of various kinds of political 
text (see Dolezal et al. 2014; Dolezal et al. 2015b).
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Following the standard approach in the literature (e.g., Geer 2006: 23), we define 
negative campaigning as any statement that is critically directed at a competitor. In our 
data, this refers to every actor–actor relation with a negative predicate whenever the 
actor addressed is a competing party or a representative of such a party. Table 1 shows 
the overall number of press releases and the share of attacks. As the BZÖ (an FPÖ 
split-off) only dates from 2005, there are fewer parties in 2002.
As mentioned above, counterattacks refer to the original actor–actor relation and 
are identified by sequence and extreme temporal closeness: Responses have to occur 
within the next one-hour interval after the original attack. Naturally, even an immedi-
ate response does not necessarily include a reference to the issue or candidate attribute 
the attacker referred to as we focus on the actors at the level of parties. Our identifica-
tion strategy thus is in line with advice by political consultants who often argue that an 
attacked candidate should not address the issue mentioned by the opponent but rather 
seek to change the topic. Moreover, also using the level of parties is in line with par-
ties’ actual behavior. A high-ranking politician, for instance, a cabinet minister, under 
attack from, let’s say, an MP is not likely to respond in person as this would enhance 
the status of the attacker.
Data Structure
To capture the interactions posited in the hypotheses, we structure our data such that 
each observation represents one directed party dyad at a specific point in time during 
the campaign. Each directed party dyad consists of a sender and a target. In addition, 
we create a dichotomous indicator that records whether there was an attack by the 
sender on the target in each hour between 8 a.m. and 12 p.m. in the six weeks prior to 
the day of the election.5 This will be the dependent variable in the statistical models. 
We use the same information to create lagged indicators of attacks from the target on 
Table 1. Press Releases: Total Numbers Coded and Shares of Attack Releases.
Year SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ BZÖ Greens Total
Total number
 2002 1,063 672 123 —a 190 2,048
 2006 1,049 477 261 297 167 2,251
 2008 834 695 397 303 222 2,451
Attack releases
 2002 44.0% 33.7% 41.5% —a 43.7% 40.7%
 2006 41.6% 50.1% 55.9% 47.8% 55.1% 50.1%
 2008 28.9% 45.3% 38.3% 45.9% 43.2% 40.3%
Source. AUTNES, only parties with representation in parliament included.
SPÖ = Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, social democrats; ÖVP = Österreichische Volkspartei, 
Christian democrats/conservatives; FPÖ = Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, populist radical right;  
BZÖ = Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, populist radical right; Greens = Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative.
a.The BZÖ was founded in 2005.
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the sender as our central independent variables. Although it is still possible that inter-
actions between parties occur at an even faster pace and thus escape our analysis (e.g., 
an attack sent out at 11.15 and a response at 11.40), using hours as the units of observa-
tion allows for many of the crucial interactions to be picked up.6
The data structure requires the use of binary time-series–cross-section (BTSCS) 
models. To capture time dependency in the data, we employ the technique proposed by 
Beck et al. (1998). In addition, we include four substantive control variables:
First, we include predictors for TV debates, which, in Austria, feature all possible 
pairs of party leaders. We assume that the televised confrontations raise the level of 
negativity between the two parties involved in the debate.
Second, we account for the ideological distance between sender and target (using data 
from the Chapel Hill expert surveys, see Bakker et al. 2015). In this regard, the literature 
generates expectations in two directions (Haynes and Rhine 1998; Ridout and Holland 
2010; Walter 2014): Proximity makes parties likely partners—which should dampen 
negative campaigning—but at the same time, these parties should also compete for the 
same pool of voters—which should make negative campaigning more likely.
Third, we account for a core feature of multiparty systems: the need to form coali-
tions. Notwithstanding the vagueness in stated party coalition preferences in Austria, 
the number of potential coalitions is actually quite limited. Drawing on coalition the-
ory, we assume ideological distance (de Swaan 1973; Martin and Stevenson 2001) and 
cabinet incumbency (Franklin and Mackie 1983; Golder et al. 2012) to be useful pre-
dictors of politicians’ expectations for the postelection period. In addition to ideologi-
cal distance, we therefore also include a dummy variable for party dyads comprised of 
two government parties.
Fourth, we account for the size ratio between sender and target, as we expect larger 
parties to be targeted more frequently, while smaller ones will often be ignored. 
Finally, random effects pick up unobserved heterogeneity at the party-dyad level 
(fixed effects models are shown in the online appendix).
Descriptive statistics of all independent variables are shown in the online appendix. 
There, we also explain how we address the time structure in the data. The number of 
observations in our data is a function of the number of directed party dyads (twenty in 
2008 and 2006, twelve in 2002) and the number of hours and days in the campaign (six 
weeks = forty-two days, 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. = sixteen hours). In addition, the use of 
lagged variables reduces the number of observations in the analysis.
Analysis
Table 2 presents the BTSCS regressions modeling dyadic attack and response patterns 
in the three campaigns. The dependent variable is dichotomous and records whether 
there was an attack from the first party in the dyad (the sender) specifically directed at 
the other party in the dyad (the target).
There is strong support for H1 in the three models. All three coefficients are positive 
and highly significant. Transforming them into odds ratios suggests that an attack from 
A on B increases the odds of a subsequent attack from B on A by somewhere between 
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47 and 80 percent. This implies that direct retaliation is a substantively important driver 
of the campaign behavior of political parties also in a multiparty PR system.
Table 2. Explaining Attacks on Target within Dyad (Direct Retaliation).
Hypothesis 2002 2006 2008
Attack from other party in dyad 
(t − 1) 
H1 0.588*** 0.387** 0.424***
(0.134) (0.126) (0.123)
Attack from any party outside 
dyad (t − 1) 
H2a 0.039 0.162 0.189†
(0.137) (0.117) (0.111)
TV debate 0.696*** 0.146 0.726***
 (0.172) (0.139) (0.119)
Left–right distance (sender–target) 0.104 −0.147 −0.045
(0.195) (0.106) (0.067)
Coalition parties −0.670 −0.666 2.044***
 (0.889) (0.843) (0.450)
Size ratio (sender–target) 0.097 −0.140† −0.447***
 (0.254) (0.074) (0.110)
Hour 9.587*** 7.386*** 7.784***
 (0.831) (0.638) (0.607)
Hour (squared) −0.634*** −0.497*** −0.518***
 (0.055) (0.043) (0.040)
Hour (cubed) 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Day 0.005 0.008* 0.001
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Spells −0.004 0.001 −0.005
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Spline 1 0.000 0.000 −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spline 2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spline 3 0.000 0.000* 0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −48.021*** −35.764*** −38.627***
 (4.127) (3.113) (2.981)
ρ .220 .203 .092
N 7,560 12,600 12,600
Log likelihood −1,333.3 −1,996.0 −2,153.4
Note. Entries are coefficients and standard errors from random-effects binary time-series–cross-section 
(BTSCS) models, with presence/absence of an attack from a specific sender on a specific target as the 
dependent variable. The number of observations is the number of party dyads × days × hours (one hour 
drops because of the lagged variables). There are twelve dyads (four parties) in 2002 and twenty dyads 
(five parties) in 2006 and 2008.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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By contrast, no significant effect is found for H2a. Attacks against a specific party 
are no more likely if the sender has come under attack from any other party. Whereas 
all the coefficients are positive, the statistical significance is too low to give us much 
confidence that the effects are not due to chance. Therefore, we cannot confirm the 
first expectation derived from our second hypothesis.
Next, we use the same data set to run three models that specify the presence of an 
attack by the first party in each directed party dyad on any party but the second party 
as the dependent variable (Table 3). This allows us to examine H2b, that is, whether 
attacks by a specific party will make it more likely that the targeted party attacks any 
other party except the attacker. As it is plausible that parties’ attack behavior is driven 
by attacks from other parties than the first party in the dyad, we control for the influ-
ence of these attacks.
The models give some support for the second implication of H2. At least in the 2002 
and 2008 campaigns, attacks from A on B had an effect on the likelihood of B attacking 
parties other than A. Both coefficients are positive and significant. The odds ratios are 
1.38 (2002) and 1.34 (2008), respectively, suggesting that an attack by a specific party 
increased the odds of the target attacking any other party by more than a third.
The coefficient for the 2006 campaign is considerably smaller (a value of 0.17 
translates into an odds ratio of 1.18) and comes with a p value of 0.13. While we can 
thus be relatively confident that some of the patterns implied by H2 were present in 
2002 and 2008, the evidence is less conclusive for 2006.
In five out of six models in Tables 2 and 3, TV debates have a strong impact on the 
probability of parties attacking each other. The coefficients of around 0.7 or 0.8 (in 
2002 and 2008) translate into odds ratios of around 2 or larger, suggesting that the odds 
of an attack on a party at least double on days when TV debates featuring that party’s 
leader take place (the effects are smaller for the 2006 campaign).
The dyad-specific control variables in Tables 2 and 3 yield some further insights. 
First, the left–right distance between sender and target is not statistically significant in 
any of the models. This may have to do with the absence of preelectoral coalitions in 
Austria where parties typically fight elections on their own.
The predictor for the incumbent coalition, by contrast, is significant in several spec-
ifications. Remember that in 2002 and 2006, the sitting government was of the center–
right (ÖVP-FPÖ and ÖVP-BZÖ, respectively), whereas a grand coalition of SPÖ and 
ÖVP was in place in 2008. The results from both sets of models suggest that the back 
and forth between these two parties was the dominant line of conflict during all cam-
paigns, no matter the composition of the incumbent government. With regard to direct 
retaliation (Table 2), the coalition predictor is significant only for the 2008 grand 
coalition. The overall level of negativity was thus considerably higher in the SPÖ-
ÖVP and ÖVP-SPÖ dyads. In Table 3, the predictors are positive and significant in 
2002 and 2006 (when the SPÖ was in opposition), meaning that attacks from the coali-
tion partner increased the probability of an attack on another party, thus suggesting 
that the main line of conflict coincided with the government—opposition divide. 
Again, the dyads comprised of the two traditional major parties are the most negative 
in those two campaigns.
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Finally, the size ratio (the ratio of sender size to target size) is negative and signifi-
cant in several model specifications, indicating that there is a tendency for larger 
Table 3. Explaining Attacks on Targets Outside Dyad.
Hypothesis 2002 2006 2008
Attack from other party within 
dyad (t − 1)
H2b 0.325* 0.172 0.291**
(0.133) (0.114) (0.109)
Attack from any party outside 
dyad (t − 1)
control −0.067 −0.177 0.045
(0.194) (0.150) (0.139)
TV debate 0.654*** 0.313** 0.824***
 (0.138) (0.099) (0.093)
Left–right distance (sender–target) −0.057 −0.029 −0.077
 (0.102) (0.079) (0.072)
Coalition parties 1.052* 1.342* 0.353
 (0.468) (0.602) (0.504)
Size ratio (sender–target) −0.521*** −0.154** −0.576***
 (0.140) (0.053) (0.112)
Hour 9.910*** 8.240*** 7.259***
 (0.621) (0.449) (0.417)
Hour (squared) −0.655*** −0.554*** −0.489***
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.027)
Hour (cubed) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Day 0.005 0.007** 0.001
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Spells −0.074 −0.412*** −0.259***
 (0.110) (0.081) (0.070)
Spline 1 −0.002 −0.012*** −0.006***
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline 2 0.001 0.003*** 0.001***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Spline 3 −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −47.278*** −38.912*** −33.656***
 (3.041) (2.205) (2.066)
ρ .075 .131 .117
N 7,560 12,600 12,600
Log likelihood −2,137.2 −3,528.3 −3,723.6
Note. Entries are coefficients and standard errors from random-effects binary time-series–cross-section 
(BTSCS) models, with presence/absence of an attack from a specific party on any party as the dependent 
variable. The number of observations is the number of party dyads × days × hours (one hour drops 
because of the lagged variables). There are twelve dyads (four parties) in 2002 and twenty dyads (five 
parties) in 2006 and 2008.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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parties to ignore their smaller competitors (and for smaller ones to focus on larger 
competitors). This effect is weaker (or nonexistent) for direct retaliation in 2002 and 
2006 (Table 2)—the two campaigns when a small party participated in government 
(FPÖ and BZÖ, respectively).
Even a cursory look at the time effects in the six models suggests that attacks 
strongly follow a daily cycle (see the online appendix). The hour variables we use to 
model this dynamic are highly significant and thus capture the attack interactions that 
occur by mere temporal coincidence (even though some of them may have been genu-
ine sequences of attacks and counterattacks). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
it is the inclusion of the hour variables that renders the spells and splines covariates 
insignificant in Table 2. Most of the time dependency picked up by these predictors 
thus relates to the daily increase and decrease in communication activity rather than to 
macrotrends over the course of the campaign.
To present our main findings more intuitively, Figure 1 reports the predicted prob-
abilities associated with H1. For the calculation of these quantities, the random part of 
the model capturing variation in the level of negative campaigning between party 
dyads (ui) was assumed to be zero.
In 2002, the increase in the probability of a targeted counterattack is from 4.4 to 7.8 
percent, in 2006, it is from 3.9 to 5.4 percent, and in 2008, it is from 4.9 to 6.9 percent. 
While these may appear to be small numbers, bear in mind that most parties do not 
attack all other parties at every hour during the campaign. While the back and forth of 
attacks and counterattacks between specific parties at certain times can be quite 
intense, most parties choose to ignore some of their competitors much of the time and 
only attack them when they feel pressured to do so.
Figure 2 plots the effects for the second part of H2. Here, we find that the baseline 
probabilities are somewhat higher. This is not surprising as the dependent variable 
now includes all attacks by a party, irrespective of who the target is. The effect sizes 
themselves, however, are rather modest, with increases in the predicted probabilities 
from around 12.5 to around 15 percent.
Conclusion
The growing literature on negative campaigning outside the United States (Nai and Walter 
2015) demonstrates that attacks are a central campaign strategy also in multiparty systems 
with PR, even though the incentives that guide party behavior in such systems are very 
different. In what constitutes (with the possible exception of de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 
2013) the first dynamic study of the logic of retaliation in a multiparty system, we report 
not only evidence for the commonalities but also the differences in attack behavior 
between two-party, winner-takes-all competition and multiparty PR systems. In both sys-
tems, actors who have been attacked display a tendency to retaliate against the perpetrator 
of the attack. In addition, we find that in multiparty systems, negative messages against 
one party are, in some cases, also reactions to attacks from a different competitor.
Our analysis uses press releases as a data source, thus being able to observe cam-
paign communication at very short time intervals. Yet it is important to consider that 
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party communication via press releases must conform to the logic of journalistic 
news selection to reach the voters. This caveat notwithstanding, our study makes 
three contributions:
First, drawing on the literature on negativity bias in information processing, we 
provide a more solid theoretical argument than previous research for why attacks by 
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of attack on targets outside dyad (H2b).
Note. Calculation of predicted probabilities based on models reported in Table 3, assuming ui = 0. All 
other covariates kept at their means (continuous variables) or modes (categorical variables).
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of attacks on target within dyad (direct retaliation, H1).
Note. Calculation of predicted probabilities based on models reported in Table 2, assuming ui = 0. All 
other covariates kept at their means (continuous variables) or modes (categorical variables).
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one political actor often elicit counterattacks. In the light of this research, responding 
in kind is indeed a rational strategy: The zero-sum nature of elections means that rela-
tive losses in support can only be compensated by attacking a competitor.
Second, the zero-sum argument has different implications for two-party and multi-
party competition. Whereas retaliation is the only plausible response strategy in two-
party systems, multiparty systems allow for more complex patterns of interactions 
between parties.
Third, we draw the most high-definition picture of the use of negative messages during 
election campaigns to date. By observing attacks and counterattacks at hourly intervals, 
we not only leverage a rich data source. The close temporal proximity between individual 
messages (and different statistical controls) also gives us greater confidence that the 
responses we observe are, in fact, caused by the attacks immediately preceding them.
Substantively, our results show that retaliation is a strong empirical phenomenon in 
multiparty elections. Yet the analyses also indicate that party interactions do not exclu-
sively follow the logic of retaliation. Parties also react to attacks by targeting other 
parties than those striking first. To be sure, the evidence for the tit-for-tat strategy is 
more robust than that for the more complex reaction patterns involving more than two 
parties. The latter empirical phenomenon must therefore be considered secondary in 
importance. We suggest that our findings may be driven by asymmetries in party size 
or strategic considerations related to postelectoral bargaining. Identifying the precise 
conditions under which parties attack each other in multiparty competition is thus one 
of the foremost tasks for future research on negative campaigning.
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Notes
1. Lau et al. (2007) report that thirty-three out of forty studies examining the impact of nega-
tive messages on the attacker find such a backlash effect.
2. Note that we do not aim to test the presence of negativity bias in political communication. 
Rather, negativity bias is part of the argument that portrays retaliation as a rational strategy.
3. In terms of substance, these two hypotheses mean similar things. Yet we separate them here 
because they demand two different empirical strategies.
4. The only exception we are aware of is Benoit’s functional analysis of campaign commu-
nication, which also considers negative references to other candidates or parties (e.g., Cho 
and Benoit 2006).
5. Excluding the hours between midnight and 8 a.m. eliminates only a tiny number of attacks 
from our sample (five in 2002, seven in 2006, and three in 2008).
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6. We have also run our models with two-hour and three-hour lags. The substantive results 
remain unchanged. The significant effects, however, are mostly present for the covariates 
lagged by one hour.
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